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BOOK REVIEWS 
THi;: EQUALITY oF STATES I?; INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Edwin De Witt Dick-
inson. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920. Harvard 'Studies 
in Jurisprudence, Vol. III.) Pp. ix, 424-
The doctrine of equality has proved as alluring and deceptive in the 
field of international as of municipal law. Until recently it has enjoyed 
almost universal acceptance. By the early political philosophers it was 
regarded as one of the immutable principles of the law of nature. To many 
of our modern publicists it has likewise presented itself as the sole rational 
basis upon. which the legal relations of states can be properly adjusted. The 
very indefiniteness of the conception has served to commend it to popular 
favor. It seemed to voice the spirit of democracy in its vindication of the 
rights of the weak as against the strong. In the smaller states, in particular, 
the doctrine has been raised to the dignity of a religious creed; it has come 
to be looked upon as the veritable ark of the covenant. upon which the 
grasping hands of the more powerful states cannot be placed without endan-
gering the peace of the world and even civilization itself. 
On the other hand, it must: be admitted that the publicists have often 
been troubled by the strange elusiveness of this so-catled fundamental prin-
ciple. The doctrine seemed to evade, if not to defy, strict legal definition. 
In certain quarters this characteristic has raised a suspicion as to the scien-
tific value of the principle itself. Nevertheless, the majority of jurists con-
tinued to accept it as an article of faith, even though they were sometimes 
prone to express grave doubts as to its strict applicability in this wicked 
and perverse world. 
To statesmen of the more powerful nations the doctrine has proved to 
be a veritable thorn in the flesh. They were generally prepared to recognize 
it in legal theory, but they were more frequently found to repudiate it in 
practice. The doctrine was, and is, manifestly incompatible with the facts 
of international life. Inequality, and not equality, is the essential character-
istic of the relations of states both inside and without the circle of nations. 
The great powers have established an hegemony against which the smaller 
states have _protested in vain. The age-long struggle between law and poli-
tics has been here transferred to the international sphere. 
It has required no little courage on the part of the author to tackle this 
most perplexing question. Fortunately, Professor Dickinson is singularly 
well equipped both in scholarship and judgmc:nt to undertake the task. His 
study reveals a remarkable familiarity with the literature of international 
law, both ancient and modern, together with a thorough understanding of 
recent developments in diplomatic history and comparative government. The 
1·esult is one of the most scholarly monographs of recent years in the field 
of international law. 
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This volume covers a wide range of subject-matter, including many 
phases of legal history, rechts philosophic, comparative government and prac-
tio,al politics. On the historical side the author has traced the origin of the 
principle of state equality back to the "applications to nations of theories of 
natural law, the state of nature and natural equality." This conception, it 
is interesting to learn, was not a part of the system of Grotius, but was the 
product of the naturalistic philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies. The doctrine was "subsequsmtly reinforceable by theories of sov-
ereignty," and th~s became "one of the primary postulates of le droit des 
gens thorique." 
The theoretical phases of the subject involve an analysis of the divergent 
interpretations of the phrase "equality of nations." A clear-cut distinction 
is drawn between equality in the sense of equality before the law,· or, as it is 
often expressed, the equal protection of the laws, and equality in the sense of 
an absolute equality of rights and possibly of obligations. The former of these 
conceptio~s, as the author points out, is essential to the existence of any legal 
system, whether municipal or international. Moreover, it is co ... ,,.:ltible "with 
the grouping of states into classes and the attributing to the members of 
each class of a status which is a measure of capacity for rights.A 
It is qqite otherwise with the second conception of equality which ascribes 
to all natiohs the possession and enjoyment of exactly the same rights and 
privileges. This conception is a pure, juristic abstraction of naturalistic origin 
and quite irreconcilable with the facts of present day international relations. 
The theory is usually presented, ho~ever, in the m~dified form of an equality 
not of rights but of capacity for rights. In this form, the doctrine repre-
sents a democratic ideal which the nations ought ever to keep before them 
in the devel~pment of the· principles of international law. 
Turning, then, to the more practical aspects of his subject, the author 
proceeds to examine in detail some of the most important legal 1imitations 
upon the equality of states. These limitations he classifies as either internal 
or external, or as constitutional or international, in character; that is to say, 
they may be imposed by the fundamental law of the state, or they may arise 
out of a state's peculiar relations with other members of the international 
community. 
The chapter on the nature of the internal limitations on state equality 
is perhaps the least satisfactory in the whole work. The reciprocal relations 
of constitutional and international law, it roust be admitted, have never been 
satisfactorily worked out. These relations vary not only from state to state 
but also raise many knotty legal questions within the states themselves. For 
example, the nature and range of the treaty-making power of the crown is 
stm a disputed question in the English constitution. It is little wonder, in 
the circumstances, that. Professor Dickinson has not succeeded in avoiding 
all of the treacherous pitfalls which waylay the investigator. Two or three 
of these difficulties may be briefly mentioned. Throughout this discussion 
the author often seems to identify the legal capacity of the executive with 
the power. of the state itself. No clear distinction is drawn between the st:lte 
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and the government of the state. The body politic, it is true, can act only 
through its duly constituted organs, so that for al! practical purposes a cor--
stitutional limitation upon the capacity of the executive in respect to foreign 
affairs does operate as a restriction upon the international competency of 
the state. The distinction, nevertheless, should not be overlooked, since 
many of these limitations are concerned with the constitutional principle of 
the division of powers rather than with the international contractual capacity 
of the state itself. 
Mtich more serious, however, is the author's tendency to read American 
legal principles into the interpretation of foreign constitutiom.. The political 
philosophy of John Marshall has taken hold upon him and has permeated 
all his thinking. But the constitutions of many foreign states have not the 
sacrosanct character of that of the United States. They are not the supreml" 
law of the land in· the strict American sense; on the contrary, they partake 
much more of the character of political than of legal instruments of govern-
ment. This must needs be the case wherever the political organs of the 
stat!:, and not the judicial, are made the guardians and final interpreters of 
the· constitution. Many of the provisions, therefore, which seemingly impose 
important limitations upon the capacity of the state ought properly to be 
regarded in the light of political maxims rather 'than as true legal inhibitions. 
In other words, they are intended for the guidance of the executive or legis-
lative departments of the government and not for the judiciary. For example, 
a member of the Swiss national assembly, 'it is safe to assert, would be 
greatly astonished to learn that Article 29 of the constitution, providing for 
the levying of low import duties upon certain articles, restricted the leg;:l 
power of the state to enter into commercial agreements with outside nations. 
That the provision has not so worked out in practice is amply demonstrated 
by the adoption of a higher and higher scale of protective duties. 
It is somewhat surprising at first to find tbat certain conventional lim-
itations upon the war- and treaty-making powers of the British Empire are 
incorporated into the discussion of the general question of the le~al com-
petency of states. That there is ample warrant for treating the convention-; 
of the British constitution as of equal value to the law of the constitution 
may well lie admitted, but the author ought certainly to have explained the 
fundamental difference in character between the two, both from the interna-
tional and constitutional standpoint. In the same connection, it may likewise 
be proper to add that Canada was not the first, nor is it the only self-govern·· 
ing colony to establish a department of external affairs whose authority 
encroaches, in fact if not in theory, upon the legal unity and supremacy of 
the English executive. 
Even more surprising, however, is the 'llUthor's failure to apply his real-
istic methods of investigation to the consideration of the practical value of 
many of these constitutional limitations in respect to foreign affairs. The 
principle of historical criticism ought to be equally applicable to constitu-
tional provisions as to political theories. For example, the constitutional 
prohibition. of the alienation of national territory is of singularly little value 
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to a defeated nation, as Turkey can testify. In all such cases it is evident 
that the right of conquest as recognized by international law overrules the 
express inhibitJon of the constitution. In other words, a constitutional pro-
vision regarding territorial intcogrity cannot be applied in the face of superiot 
force.· For all practical purposes, all such constitutional provisions have no 
international validity and do not operate as limitations upon the inherent 
power of the state to cede territory in case of necessity. 
The chapter on tlie limitation of the political equality of states contains 
much new and interesting material. The author brings out clearly the 
essential distinction between the legal equality of stat~s and their political 
equality in respect to international organization, and finds little difficulty in 
demonstrating the inapplicability of the principle of political equality to the 
great deliberative conferences of our day. No legal fiction can possibly 
place Hayti and Panama on an actual political equality with the United 
States or the great European powers. To disregard the existing dispropor-
tions in size, population and resources of the various states would violate 
the fundamental principle of democracy itself by placing the direction oi 
the ~rld's affairs in the hands of an insignificant minority of its inhabitants. 
As the author well states, "insist>ence upon the complete political equality 
in the constituting and functioning of an international . union, tribunal or 
concert is simply another way of denying the possibility of effective inter-
national organization." 
The supplementary chapter on the equality of nations at the Paris Con-
ference is disappointing. It has manifestly been added as an after-thought 
in an attempt to bring the study up to date. It is, perhaps, too much to 
expect the author f;o add to his erudition as a scholar the still greater gift 
of prophesy, but the public had every reason to believe from the high quality 
of the preceding chapters that the discussion would involve something more 
than a repetitious resume of some of the chief provisions of the treaty. 
Notwithstanding this anti-climax, the book stands forth as a distinct 
landmark in the development of the principles of international law. There 
have been more than ~nough general text-books on international law. The 
need has long been manifest for a critical analysis of some of the so-called 
fundamental principles of the subject: The war, fortunately, has swept away 
many of the shams and fictions which have detracted from the true legal 
character of international law. The time has now come to rebuild its prin-
ciples upon the sure foundation of international facts. To this great under-
taking Professor Dickinson has made a most important contribution. He 
bas attacked one of the most sacred of these intematiopal fictions and has. 
made out an irrefutable case for a reconstruction of both the theory and 
practice of representation. The volume, in short, is a worthy addition to 
the Harvard Studies in Jurisprudence. It is sincerely to be hoped that this 
is only th~ first of a series of studies by the author in this general field. 
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